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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF T

-----..-..- -

STATE OF IDAHO
CHARLES COWARD and
husband and wife,

COWARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CRYSTAL HADLEY, an individual,
Defendant-Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DOCKET NO. 36981-2009
Bonner County Case
No. CV-2007-1997
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

1

I

1

RESPONDENT' S BRIEF

I

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner
THE HONORABLE STEVE VERBY, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING
Gary A. Finney
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Ste 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
HADLEY

Arthur M. Bistline
Law Office of Arthur M.
Bistline
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d1Alene, Idaho 83814
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT COWARD
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

BRIEF NATURE OF THE CASE

he--Plaintiff-Appell;ant; hereinafter---COWARD,
--f
iled---a-

I

Complaint seeking a prescriptive easement over property of
the Defendant-Respondent, hereinafter HADLEY.

Two (2) days

before the trial, COWARD moved to amend to add theories of
implied easement and of express easement.
11.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL

COWARD'S proceeding at trial was largely their facts on
the claim of prescriptive easement, which was dismissed by
I

the Court setting forth findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and an Order in open Court and on the record.

An Order

of Dismissal was entered (R. p. 59), and the issues of
I
I

-

_

_easement by implication and express easement were retained

I

for further determination.
I

There was no more of the trial, as the remaining issues
were submitted on briefing from the parties.

The Court

issued a Memorandum Opinion (R. p. 79) that COWARD failed to
prove entitlement upon the theories of prescriptive
easement, implied easement, or express easement.

Motions to

reconsider were submitted and the Court issued an Amended
Memorandum Decision and Orders on Post Trial Motions (R. p.
99) which again denied any relief to COWARD with additional
findings and conclusions by the Court.

Judgment in Favor of

the Defendant and Against the Plaintiff was entered August

4, 2009. (R. p. 118)
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HADLEY sought an award of attorney fees (R. p. 121),
which was resisted by COWARD. (R. p. 132).

The Court denied

an award of attorney fees to HADLEY (R. p. 144).

COWARD

filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. p. 137) HADLEY filed a Notice
of Cross-Appeal. (R. p. 140).
111. STATEMENT OF FACTS

COWARD'S paragraph C. Statement of Facts is short and
concise; however, the Court's Amended Memorandum (R. p. 99)
sets forth more accurate findings of fact, as paragraph A. 1
through 14, which is relied upon by HADLEY.
A map of the area in issue is Plaintiff's Exhibit 42, a
copy of which is HADLEY'S Attachment A to this brief for
reference.

HADLEY'S Lot 1 is depicted as is COWARD'S Lot 2,

which has markings showing the claimed easement as the strip
in question.
The legal and factual issues start with the Court's
findings of fact 1 and 2. (R. p. 99-100) that state,
1.

Plaintiffs (Cowards) are the owners of Lot 2,
Block JJ of the Laws addition to the City of
Sandpoint. Defendant (Crystal HADLEY) is the
owher of Lot 1, Block JJ of the Laws addition to
the City of Sandpoint. The Coward's lot, the
HADLEY'S lot, and the adjoining Lot 11, lying
directly to the south of the Coward's, were owned
by Freeman Daughters in 1922.

2.

In 1922, by Instrument No. 53126, Daughters
transferred Lots 1 and 2 to Ole Sletager with the
following in the legal description:
Lots One (1) and two (2) in Block "JJ"
of Law's second Addition to Sandpoint,
Idaho; provided, however, the party of
the first part herein [Daughters] his
heirs and assigns shall have a permanent
right of way over and across twelve feet
on the east side or end of each of said
lots for the purpose of an alley.
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In other words, in 1922 Freeman Daughters owned Lots 1,
I

I

2 and 11, all adjacent lots, in the City of Sandpoint,
ounty, Idaho, and he kept Lot 11 and by Warran
Deed conveyed Lots 1 and 2 to Ole Sletager reserving a 12
foot wide easement on the east side.

I

In easement language, Lots 1 and 2 were the servient
real estate and Lot 11 retained by Daughters was the
dominant real estate.

Daughters, 3 years later, conveyed

the dominant estate, Lot 11, to Jack Blake, and the deed
contained language also conveying the easement that
Daughters had reserved over the 12 feet on the east end of

I

Lots 1 and 2.

I

as to Lot 1 and 2, neither Lot would have an easement over

Sletager had acquired Lots 1 and 2 from Daughters, and

the other Lot because Sletager owned both Lots.
is the right to use the land of another.

An easement

Ownership of Lot 1

and 2 was ultimately divided, as stated by the Court in its
Findings of Fact, A. 5 (R. p. LOO), that
"Lot 2 was ultimately deeded to George
and Alice Donahue, the Cowardsr
predecessors in interest, who were not
conveyed any easement over Lot 1. Lot 2
in the chain of title has never had an
appurtenant easement over Lot 1. Lot 2
was the Servient estate to an easement
in favor of
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
In addition to the Issues presented on Appeal by
COWARD, as issues 1, 2 and 3, HADLEY presents the following
additional issues :
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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4.

LOT 11 IS THE DOMINANT ESTATE AND LOTS 1 AND
2 ARE THE SERVIENT ESTATE, LOTS 1 AND 2 BEING
CONVEYED TO SLETAGER, SLETAGER OWNED BOTH
LOTS AND AS A MATTER OF LAW COULD NOT HAVE AN
EASEMENT OVER HIS OWN LOT 1 IN FAVOR OF HIS
LOT 2.

5.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DENYING
ATTORNEY FEES TO HADLEY? THIS IS HADLEY'S
ISSUE ON HER CROSS-APPEAL.

6.

IS HADLEY ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON
APPEAL?
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

-

CLAIMED

HADLEY claims attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R.
41, the basis of which is that COWARD brought and pursued and
this Appeal without a reasonable basis in fact or law, and
from the facts presented is frivolous, unreasonable, and
without merit.

The basis of HADLEYrS claim for attorney fees

--

is I.R.C.P. 54(e) (l), Idaho Code 512-121, and Idaho Code 512123(a)(b-ii).

COWARD'S conduct upon this appeal is frivolous

in that it is not supported in fact or warranted under
existing law, and can not be supported by a good faith
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law.
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
COWARD assigns three (3) issues presented on appeal.
HADLEY responds to each, as follows:
ISSUE 1.

Whether the Trial Court committed error when

it determined that the fence line agreement extinguished any
easement rights that COWARD may have had over HADLEY'S
property?
HADLEY'S RESPONSE TO ISSUE 1:
a)

The Trial Court did not err in determining that
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the Agreement As To Boundary Line, Defendant's Exhibit D,
extinguished (released) any easement rights of COWARD over
HADLEY'S property.

tfiisdG~ceermiiiation
was in .error,..itis

...

irrelevant because COWARD had no easement over HADLEY'S
property, either express or implied.
The Agreement As To Boundary Line, Defendant's Exhibit
D, was signed, acknowledged, and recorded the last week of
February, 2007, just nine (9) months before COWARD filed
this action on November 29, 2007.

COWARD'S

Argument,

Appellant's Brief, top of page 7, is that the Agreement does
not extinguish or release COWARD'S claimed easement, because
an easement is the right to use the land of another for a
specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general
use of the property by the owner.

(citation given for

Backman v . Laurence, 147 Idaho 390, 210 P.3d 765, 80).
HADLEY agrees with the foregoing as an accurate statement of
law; however, COWARD does not define or set forth Idaho law
that an easement is an interest in land of another.
Schultz v . Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 554 P.2d 948 (1996) at
page 773 states,
"The term "easement" has been variously
defined and a detailed definition of the
term is not necessary for the purposes
of this opinion. However, an essential
element of an easement is that it is "an
interest in land in the possession of
another".
Restatement of Property S450
(1944).
[3,4J Creation of an easement by express
agreement requires that the agreement be
in writing as an easement is an interest
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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in real property. I.C. §9-503 McReynolds
v. Harrigfeld, 26 Idaho 26, 140 P. 1096
(1914) ***".
Clearly, an easement is an interest in real property of

I
I

COWARD claims an easement interest in the real property of
HADLEY.

I

The District Court held that the Agreement As To
Boundary Line was a release by agreement between the owner
of the easement (COWARD) and the owner (HADLEY) of the

i

I

servient tenement.
COWARD tries to narrow the full provisions of the

I

Boundary Line Agreement, by referring to it as "the fence

I
I

line agreementr1. COWARD states that the agreement pertains
only to ownership of the parties' respective properties and
does not pertain to easements.
last paragraph)

(Appellant's Brief, pg 7,

HADLEY submits that COWARD is in error

because an "easement" is an ownership interest in real
property of another.
property of HADLEY.

COWARD claims an easement in the real
COWARD'S Appellant's Brief pages 5-6

included language of the Agreement.

The last provision of

the Agreement that is a release of COWARD'S claimed easement
to HADLEY'S Lot 1 is the provision that says,

"***/ and another other legal, equitable, or
statutory doctrine does not apply to alter
the legal descriptions, ownership, boundary,
or title to the real estate of either party."

I

I

Applying this above quoted provision is that if COWARD
had a claimed easement to HADLEY'S Lot 1 it would alter
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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HADLEY'S ownership and title because the claimed easement as
an interest in HADLEY'S real estate would diminish her title
and her ownership as it would create a servitude against
COWARD'S Lot 2 as the dominant
estate.

An easement would be an encumbrance against

HADLEY'S real estate as the Servient real estate in favor of
COWARD'S real estate at the dominant real estate.
In this action COWARD specifically claimed the easement
they sought was an encumbrance on HADLEY'S Lot 1.

The

District Court, Findings of Fact 14 states,
"Anne Coward subsequently recorded a Lis
Pendens (Instrument No. 744377) as part
of this action, in which she claimed an
"encumbrance" on Crystal Hadley's Lot
1."

An easement for COWARD would create a "servitude" on
HADLEY'S real estate.

The case of Seccombe v. Weeks, 115

Idaho 433, 467 P.2d 276 (1989) further explains that,
"An easement may be created by way of
exception or by reservation. Technically, an
exception is the withholding of title to a
portion of the property conveyed by the
grantor; a reservation creates some new right
in favor of the grantor in the conveyed
property, conceptually thought of as an
express grant of the easement by the grantee.
See, 2 0. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY $23332, 334 ( j .
Grimes 1980 replacement). No particular
forms or words of art are necessary; it is
necessary only that the parties make clear
their intention to establish a servitude.
Regardless of the terms used, courts
generally will attempt to ascertain the
intention of the parties by referring not
only to the language of the deed, but also to
the circumstances attending the transaction
and the condition of the property. Id.

Seccombe v. Weeks,
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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115 Idaho 433, 467 P.2d 276 (1989)
An easement is also a conveyance which affects title to

j

real property.

West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord, 141

''[13] Idaho Code $56-101 is addressed to
"conveyances" and "liens" which have not been
recorded at the time a foreclosure action
commences. The statute mandates that a
foreclosure judgment is conclusive against
the parties holding unrecorded conveyances or
liens. Although not made applicable to I.C.
6 - 1 0 a "conveyance" is defined in Idaho
Code Title 55, Chapter 8 as "[embracing]
every instrument in writing by which any
estate or interest in real property is
created, alienated, mortgaged or encumbered,
or by which the title to any real property
may be affected, except wills."
West Wood Investments, Inc. v. Acord,
141 Idaho 75 at p. 83 (2004), 467 P.2d 276 (1989)
ISSUE 2.

Whether the language in the 1922 deed from

Freeman Daughters to O.E. Sletager created an express
easement appurtenant to COWARD'S

lot which would allow

COWARD access to the lot across the back of HADLEY'S lot?
HADLEY'S RESPONSE TO ISSUE 2:

The answer to the issue

phrased by COWARD is that the language in the 1922 deed from

-

Daughters to Sletager could not as a matter of law create an
express easement appurtenant to COWARD'S Lot 2 allowing
COWARD access to the lot (lot 2) across the back of HADLEY'S
lot (lot 1).

This is based on a straight forward definition

of an easement.

When Daughters deeded Lots 1 and 2 to

Sletager, Sletager then owned Lots 1 and 2 and Daughters
retained and owned Lot 11.

The express easement language

was for a reserved easement over Lots 1 and 2 in favor of,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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or appurtenant, to Daughters' Lot 11.
What easement would be created as between Lots 1 and 2?
The answer is none because Sletager then owned Lots 1 and 2
ed
over these lots because both lots were owned by Sletager.
It is by definition that an easement is an interest in land
in the possession of another. (Schultz v . Atkins, 97 Idaho
770, 773, 554 P.2d 948 (1976).
One can not have an easement in his own land.

In other

words, Sletager could not have an easement in favor of his
Lot 2 over his own Lot 2.
It is simply not possible for a person to own both an
easement and the property to which that easement attaches.
In Gardner v . Fliegel, 92 Idaho 676, 771, 450 P.2d 990
(1969), Fliegel had been conveyed property by two separate
warranty deeds.

The deed covering the easterly portion of

the property included the phrase "less a strip 30 feet wide
of the east side for a roadway and all ditch rights of way.
The ultimate issue presented at trial was to determine what
the parties intended by the term "less a strip of land 30
feet wide off the East side for roadwayrf. (Gardner v .
Fliegel, 92 Idaho 767, 769.

Gardner asserted that the 30

foot strip was excepted completely from the conveyances to
Fliegel.

Fliegel contended that they had been granted title

to the thirty (30) foot strip, subject to an easement for a
roadway.

The Supreme Court ruled the language used was

ambiguous, as on the one hand it expresses intent to retain
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the fee to the strip in the grantor.

On the other it

expresses the intent to create an easement for roadway over
e strip in favor of the grantor.

The second expression of

"***for the reason that "an easement is
defined as a right in the lands of
another, and therefore one cannot have
an easement in his own lands, ***Johnson
v. Gustafson, 49 Idaho 376, 381, 288 P.
427, 429 (1930)".
Gardner v . Fliegel
92 Idaho 767 at 771, 450 P.2d 990 (1969)

I
l

The District Judge's findings of fact, paragraph A., 3
through 14, (Amended Memorandum Decision, R. pg 100-102) is
a complete chronological recital of the subsequent

I

conveyances of Lots 1 and 2 (Servient easement) and Lot 11
(dominant estate

-

to which the Daughters' reservation of

easement was appurtenant).
"Findings of Fact 4. First, three (3) years
after 1922, Daughters transferred Lot 11 to
Blake, the deed contained the following
language :
Also, a permanent right of way over and
across twelve feet on the east side or
end of Lots one (1) and two (2), Block
\'JJr' Laws Second Addition to Sandpoint,
Idaho, for the purposes of an alley.
In other words, Lot 11 was conveyed by Daughters
together with an easement that he has reserved over Lots 1
and 2 when he conveyed them to Sletager.
Subsequently Lots 1 and 2 were conveyed separately to
new owners.

Finding of Fact 5. (R. p. 100) states:

"Lot 2 was ultimately deeded to George
and Alice Donahue, the Cowards'
predecessors in interest, who were not
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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conveyed any easement over Lot 1. Lot 2
in the chain of title has never had an
appurtenant easement over Lot 1. Lot 2
was the servient estate to an easement
in favor of Lot 11.''
t conveye
easement when Lot 2 was separated from Lot 1.

Donahue is a

predecessor of COWARD in the chain of title to Lot 2.

The

District Court's Finding of Fact 5 is dispositive and is
fatal to COWARD'S appeal issue 2, and the District Court
expanded on the Lot 2 chain of title saying,
Finding of Fact 9. (R. p. 101)
"Alice Donahue, as a widow, deeded Lot 2
to Chapman (Instrument No. 117518), in
1968 without any conveyance of an
easement in favor of Lot 2. Chapman
deeded Lot 2 (Instrument No. 172403) in
1976 to Montgomery without any
conveyance of an easement in favor of
LO^ 2Trr

For this appeal, COWARD, has not claimed the District
Court made any errors in the Findings of Fact, at all.
COWARD has accepted the findings of fact 1 through 14, which
clearly demonstrate that Lot 2 never acquired any express
easement at any time; more specifically Lot 1 and 2 were
conveyed by Daughters in common ownership to Sletager, so as
a matter of law Lot 2 could not have an appurtenant easement
in its favor to go across Lot 1. When Lot 2 was separated
from Lot 1, there could be "nov automatic appurtenant
easement.

Further no easement was ever conveyed or reserved

in favor of Lot 2; as the District Court found (Finding of
Fact, 5, second sentence, R. p. 101),
"Lot 2 in the chain of title has never
had an appurtenant easement over Lot 1."
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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ISSUE 3.

Whether the language in the 1922 deed from

Freeman Daughters to O.E. Sletager created an implied

1
I

asement app
COWARD access to their lot across the back of HADLEY'S lot?
HADLEY'S RESPONSE TO ISSUE 3:

The Idaho law of implied

easements is such that the 1922 deed from Daughters to
Sletager could not create an implied easement over Lot 1 for
use by Lot 2.

First, the elementary law of easements,

previously set forth in this brief is that an easement is
the right to use the land of another.

In 1922 when Sletager

acquired Lots 1 and 2, he owned both lots and could use his
lots for access, or otherwise, in any location he desired.
He could not, as a matter of law, have an easement, express,
implied, or prescriptive over his own Lot 2 in favor of his
own Lot 1.
Second, COWARD has not stated or set forth the Idaho
law of implied easements.

Rather, COWARD'S argument on

implied easement seems to be set forth in paragraph B.
starting on page 13 to the end of Appellant's Brief.
COWARD'S case law and argument is set forth under a new and
different theory of law, never raised or briefed as part of
the District Court action.
COWARD'S Argument and law on the theory of an implied
easement commences at paragraph B on page 13, and continues
to the end of Appellant's Brief.

COWARD makes no citation

of Idaho law on implied easements.

Rather, COWARD cites to

Idaho law on dedication of a public way.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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This is Smylie v .

P e a r s a l l , 93 Idaho 188, 191, 475 P.2d 427, 430 (1969) which
holds t h a t f i l i n g a p l a t showing streets and a l l e y s on t h e
p l a t and s a l e s are made with r e f e r e n c e t h e r e t o , c o n s t i t u t e s
LEY does n o t

d i s p u t e t h i s case l a w , b u t h e r response i s t h a t such a
theory and case law w a s n o t advanced a t t r i a l l e v e l , b u t
r a t h e r f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l .

F u r t h e r , COWARD s t a t e s

t h a t "it f o l l o w s f r t h a t when a g r a n t i s bounded by an a l l e y
an i m p l i e d r i g h t t o u s e t h a t a l l e y i n a l l t h o s e who a b u t i t
arises.

COWARD f u r t h e r s t a t e s t h a t , "This i s n o t a novel

t h e o r y , j u s t one n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y adopted i n Idaho."

In

o t h e r words, t h i s i s n o t Idaho law!
The problem w i t h COWARD'S statement t h a t "it follows"
t h a t where a g r a n t i s bounded by an a l l e y i s n o t w i t h i n t h e
f a c t s of t h e i n s t a n t a c t i o n .
by an a l l e y on t h e P l a t .

Lots 1 and 2 a r e n o t bounded

( P l a i n t i f f s ' E x h i b i t 42 and

Defendant's E x h i b i t s C and Q) .

COWARD'S o n l y Idaho c i t a t i o n i s t o t h e Smylie v.
P e a r s a l l case, s u p r a , on t h e e f f e c t of a d e d i c a t i o n on a
plat.

COWARD p r e s e n t s no c a s e l a w on "implied easements".

COWARD'S remaining argument on page 1 4 i s of a g e n e r a l
s t r i n g o f c i t a t i o n s from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s , with no
a n a l y s i s of how t h e y apply.

Idaho h a s d e f i n i t e and s p e c i f i c

l a w on i m p l i e d easements, which i s a s f o l l o w s :
An i m p l i e d easement can a r i s e from p r i o r u s e o r

necessity.

Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362

(1999) a t 642 s t a t e s t h a t from p r i o r cases i t i s c l e a r t h a t
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there are two kinds of implied easements: (1) by way of
necessity; and (2) implied from prior use.

In 1922 Sletager

was conveyed Lots 1 and 2, with the grantor (Daughters)
reserving

an easement over

Daughters' remaining property Lot 11.

Lot 11 is the

dominant estate to which the reserved easement is
appurtenant.

The easement status at that time in 1922 as

between Lots 1 and 2, is nothing.

First, Sletager then owns

Lots 1 and 2 and can "access" anywhere on either lot to and
from the other lot.
of another.

He as owner has no easement to use land

Neither necessity nor prior use existed.

Further, the Idaho law of implied easement is:
A)

The law on implied easement as a way of necessity

is defined in Burley Brick and Sand, 102 Idaho 333, 629 P.2d
1116 (1981) is:
'A way of necessity arises where there
is a conveyance of a part of a tract of
land of such nature and extent that
either the part conveyed or the part
retained is entirely surrounded by the
land from which it is severed or by this
land and the land of strangers. It is a
universally established principal that
where a tract of land is conveyed which
is separated from the highway by other
lands of the grantor or surrounded by
his lands or by his and those of third
persons, there arises, by implication,
in favor of the grantee, a way of
necessity across the premises of the
grantor to the highway."
The Lots 1, 2 and 11 are all in the Amended Plat of
Law's Second Addition (1904), a depiction of which is the
Plaintiff's Exhibit 42.

As is apparent, Lots 1, 2, and 11

are all contiguous to a Sandpoint, Idaho, City Street, Boyer
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Avenue on their west side.

This is shown from trial

exhibits that are the Plat (Defendant's Exhibit Q ) , the
Record of Survey, recorded May 20, 2000 as Instrument No.,
564398 (Defendant's
Exhibit 42).

laintiff' s

Since all of Lots 1, 2, and 11 are adjoining

Boyer Avenue, a public street, i.e. a highway, none of the
lots have any necessity to have an implied easement.
B)

The law on implied easement by way of implication

is D a v i s v . Peacock, supra, 133 Idaho 637 at 642,

.

". . (1) unity of title or ownership and
subsequent separation by grant of the
dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous
use long enough before separation of the
dominant estate to show that the use was
intended to be permanent; and (3) the
easement must be reasonably necessary to
the proper enjoyment of the dominant
estate . . . "
D a v i s v . Peacock
133 Idaho 637 at 642 (1999)
COWARD presented no testimony or evidence of elements
(2) and (3).

There is nothing in the record as to (2)

apparent continuous use before the 1922 separation of Lots 1
and 2 from Lot 11.

Also, there is nothing in the record as

to an implied easement because of necessity to the use of
dominant estate.

The opposite is true, Lots 1, 2 and 11 all

adjoin Boyer Avenue, a public street, so there is no
necessity, at all.
COWARD'S APPELLANT'S BRIEF HAS NO "CONCLUSION"
I.A.R. 35(a) requires the Appellant's Brief to have
divisions under appropriate headings.
requires a heading of: Conclusion.
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I.A.R. 35 (a)(7)

A short conclusion

stating the precise relief sought.

COWARD'S Appellant's

Brief has no such heading and it has no statement, precise

I

or otherwise of the relief sought.

n

1

result in the Supreme Court refusing to address the noncomplied with I.A.R.

In Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho

497, 927 P.2d 887 (1996) the cross-appellants listed in
their initial brief on appeal as an additional issue on
I

I

appeal an award of all costs incurred after their offer of
judgment. Also, the appellant in its statement of issues in
its initial brief on appeal requested an award of attorney

i

fees.

The Supreme Court did not address either of these

because the briefs did comply with I .A.R. (a)( 6 )
!

I

In the instant action, COWARD has not complied with

I .A.R. 35 (a)(7).

The case of SE/Z Construction v. Idaho

State University, 140 Idaho 8, 89 P.3d 848 (2004) at page 14
specifically states that I.A.R. 35(a)(7) requires that an
Appellant's Brief contain a short statement stating the
precise relief sought.

The respondent asserted that the

appellant's brief failed to state what relief appellant
seeks.

The Supreme Court stated,

"*** In its conclusion, the appellants'
brief states: "the Court's original
opinion should be withdrawn, and the
State and ISU should be required to
follow their own clear and unambiguous
bid documents. The matter should be
remanded to the trial court for
determination of an appropriate remedy
to which SE/Z is entitled under the
circumstances." In the context of this
appeal, this is a sufficient statement
of the relief appellant seeks for
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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purposes of I.A.R. 35(a) (7)."
Unlike

SE/Z Construction v .

Idaho State University,

supra, COWARD'S initial brief, its Appellant's Brief, has no
t, at all,
relief is sought on appeal.

The Supreme Court should not

have the duty to search and review the record for errors or
to give relief to COWARD on appeal.

HADLEY requests that no

relief be granted to COWARD on appeal because of the failure
to comply with I.A.R. 35 (a)(7).
HADLEY'S CROSS-APPEAL ISSUE OF
ATTORNEY FEES AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL
The District Court found HADLEY to be the prevailing
party below, but declined to award attorney fees to HADLEY.
HADLEY filed Defendant's Motion To Alter, Amend, Reconsider,
And To Make Additional Findings And Conclusions Awarding
Attorney Fees To The Defendant and Notice of Hearing and
Oral Argument, which is in the record at R. p. 121-131.
This Motion included a request to award attorney fees, with
the supporting citations of law and an analysis of the facts
presented and the results obtained.

The basis of the

request for attorney fees was Rule 54(a)(l) and Idaho Code
912-121.

At the hearing on HADLEY'S Motion, the District

Judge orally denied attorney fees on a conclusion basis, set
forth at R. p. 136, and entered an Order Denying Defendant
Hadleyrs Motion To Alter, Amend, Reconsider, And To Make
Additional Findings And Conclusions Awarding Attorney Fees
To The Defendant (R. p. 144-145).

Neither the oral ruling

nor the written Order of the District Court had any findings
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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setting forth the basis and reasons for denial of attorney
fees to HADLEY, except address the result in the negative,

1

i.e. the Court does not find that COWARD brought, pursued,

foundation. (R. p. 145) .

Why not?

HADLEY had submitted a total analysis showing how
COWARD pursued the action and failed totally.

HADLEY'S

analysis is further presented herein.
The Complaint pled only one theory, which was an
easement by prescription.
The Answer and Counterclaim alleged that COWARD had no
express easement, easement by necessity, easement by
implication, easement by prescription, or any other easement
to use KADLEY'S real estate; further, that the Complaint and
action was frivolous, unreasonable, and without merit and
that HADLEY was entitled to recover her attorney fees from
the COWARD.

The Counterclaim, paragraph 11, alleged that by

an Agreement as to Boundary Line, recorded February 26,
2007, Instrument No. 723577, COWARD had extinguished any
interest for access or other legal or equitable doctrine and
sought quiet title as to HADLEY'S real estate against
COWARD, and it sought attorney fees.
The Trial was held September 29, 2008.

For the trial,

HADLEY filed Hadley's Trial Memorandum and Proposed Finding
and Conclusions, filed September 16, 2008, which pointed out
the elements and the inability of COWARD to prove a
prescriptive easement.
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Further, the Agreement as to

Boundary Line provided that the possession, occupancy, or
use of the real estate was by consent and no doctrine would
I

apply to alter ownership or title to the real property.
ts or law
relative to the issue of a prescriptive easement; however,
COWARD went to trial and proceeded on their prescriptive
easement action.

At the end of the trial on the

prescriptive easement claim HADLEY moved for "non-suit"
against COWARD, which was then taken under advisement by the
Court.

At the end of HADLEY'S defense to the prescriptive

easement action the Court granted a Rule 41(b) involuntary
dismissal; and alternatively entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law in open Court, upon the record that
HADLEY prevailed on the trial of the merits and the
Complaint for prescriptive easement was dismissed.

(See,

Order Granting Defendant's Motion To Dismiss And Dismissing
Plaintiffs' Cause Of Action For Prescriptive Easement)(R. p.

59).

COWARD'S prescriptive easement claim was not supported

by facts in their case to avoid a Rule 41 dismissal.

In

other words, from the "facts presented" by COWARD, their
case was entirely devoid of any merit, i.e. frivolous,
unreasonable, and without foundation.
COWARD'S Amended Complaint set forth claims of Express
Easement and Easement by Implication, but COWARD'S Trial
Brief, page 4, first sentence, admits:
"There is no Idaho case on this type of implied
easement."
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COWARD'S theory of implied easement was acknowledged to
be unsupported by any Idaho case law, to which any facts
could be presented for them to prevail.

This indicates the

le, and without foundation natur
I

I

COWARD'S implied easement claim.
COWARD moved to amend and the Court permitted the
filing of an Amended Complaint, which added, paragraph 4,

I

that a 1922 deed, Instrument No. 53126, either by express
terms or by an implied right, was created by that

I

I

instrument.
There was no more "trial", and no more testimony was
presented, only briefing was submitted to the Court.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING ATTORNEY FEES TO
THE DEFENDANT BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF A SINGLE ISSUE OF THIS
MULTI-ISSUE ACTION.

The Court's Amended Memorandum

Decision, page 17, paragraph H, is the Court's

analysis on

HADLEYfS request for attorney fees under Idaho Code $ 12-121
and Rule 54(e)(1).

.

54 (e)(1)

The Court cited the provisions of Rule

The Court denied attorney fees to HADLEY by

single analysis to what appears to be only the COWARD'S
express easement theory by stating that what the parties to
the 1922 deed intended by reserving an "alley" as a disputed
question of fact, and it does not appear COWARD brought this
action and pursued it frivolously, unreasonably, and without
foundation in fact or law, as alleged by HADLEY.
This analysis of a single issue, express easement,
makes no analysis of who prevailed "in the action" or of the
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other issues of this action.

The other issues were:

a.

prescriptive easement

b.

implied easement

c.

Agreement as to Boundary Line

d.

trespass

e.

quiet title

HADLEY actually prevailed on all five (5) of these
issues, and in the action, without COWARD ever presenting
any fact or law to support prescriptive easement or implied
easement.
As to the Prescriptive Easement

-

COWARD suffered a

"non-suit" dismissal of this cause of action.

In other

words, this cause of action, the Complaint, was dismissed,
as stated in Rule 41(b) because of the ground that "...upon
the facts and the law the Plaintiff has shown no right to
relief."

In other words, the prescriptive easement action

through trial, upon the facts presented, had no basis in
fact or law, which is "without foundation".
ATTORNEY FEES ARE AWARDED TO THE PARTY THAT PREVAILS
"IN THE ACTIONtfAS AN OVERALL VIEW, NOT A CLAIM-BY-CLAIM

The Case of Eighteen Mile Ranch v . Nord Excavating, 141
Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005) states:
" . . .In determining which party prevailed
in an action where there are claims and
counterclaims between opposing parties,
the court determines who prevailed 'in
the actionf. That is, the prevailing
party question is examined and
determined from an overall view, not a
claim-by-claim analysis."
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In Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho
716 at 719, the Supreme Court referred to the fact that

most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved".
In the instant action, HADLEY incurred no liability,
COWARD prevailed on none of their three (3) theories of
easements; prescriptive, implied, or express, HADLEY
prevailed in trespass and quiet title.

In other words,

HADLEY received the most favorable outcome that could be
achieved, demonstrating that COWARD'S entire action and
defense was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation
As stated in the Court's Amended Memorandum Decision,
page 11, paragraph C.,
"The Cowards released any claimed right
to lot 1 when they signed the Agreement
on February 2007".
Having agreed in writing to extinguish any claimed
right to HADLEY'S real estate, within nine (9) months time
they filed this action, Complaint, on November 29, 2007,
seeking a claimed easement right and they recorded a Lis
Pendens, January 14, 2009, Instrument No. 744377
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 32) in which they claimed that they had
an "action encumbering" HADLEY' S real estate.
The Court's analysis of COWARD'S express easement claim
as involving "a disputed question of fact" does not shed any
light on the fact that was supposedly disputed, nor was
there a disputed fact on COWARD'S
failed as a matter of law.
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express easement claim, it

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

- ARGUMENT

HADLEY seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R.

-

41 based on Idaho Code S12-123 and Idaho Code $12-121.
aho Code S12-123 applies as C
reasonable basis in fact or law, and Idaho Code S12-121
applies as COWARD'S acts on appeal are frivolous,
I

unreasonably, or without foundation.

These statutes apply

because COWARD'S issues are nothing more than asking the
appellant court to second guess the trial court.

On

COWARD'S first (1) issue presented on appeal, COWARD'S
argument is that their action for a prescriptive easement,
express easement, and implied easement does not affect
HADLEY'S ownership or title; and, therefore that language of
the Agreement As To Boundary Line, Defendant's Exhibit D,
could not extinguish or release their claims against HADLEY
and HADLEY'S real estate because an easement is only the
right to use the land of another.

COWARD'S response and

argument to this issue shows that an easement is an interest
in real property that affects and encumbers the title and
ownership of the real property.

COWARD does not recognize

this on the appeal, but as pointed out by the District
Court, in Findings of Fact 14, "Anne Coward subsequently
recorded a Lis Pendens (Instrument No. 744377) as part of
this action, in which she claimed an "encumbrance" on
Crystal Hadley's Lot 1. "

An "encumbrance" of a claimed

easement by the lawsuit clearly affects HADLEY'S ownership
and title to Lot 1, which was agreed to be extinguished or

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

- 23

released by the express language of the Agreement.

COWARD'S

Issue 1 is unreasonable, frivolous, without foundation, and
is without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
As to COWARD'S second (2) issues presented on appeal
wherein they claim the 1922 deed for Lots 1 and 2 from
Daughters to Sletager wherein Daughters reserved an easement
over Lots 1 and 2, also created an express easement in favor
of Lot 2 to cross over Lot 1.

This argument totally ignores

that Lot 1 and 2 were both then owned by Sletager, who could
cross over and use either property wherever desired without
an easement.

The Idaho law is that the owner of property

can not have an easement in his own property, because the
definition of an easement is the right to use property of
Issue 2 is unreasonable, frivolous, without

another person.

foundation, and is without reasonable basis in fact or law.
COWARD'S third (3) issue on appeal is that the 1922
deed from Daughters to Sletager created an implied easement
appurtenant to COWARDfS lot (Lot 2) which would allow COWARD
access to their lot across HADLEY'S
all, COWARD'S Appellant's
on "implied easements".

lot (Lot 1).

First of

Brief does not set forth any law
The 1922 conveyance would not

create an implied easement in favor of Lot 2 over Lot 1
because Sletager then owned both Lots 1 and 2.

None of the

elements of an implied easement, either by prior use or by
necessity, existed and COWARD has not briefed that legal
theory.

As is shown in HADLEYfS Response to Issue 3, there

can be no implied easement.
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COWARD'S

issue 3 is

unreasonable, frivolous, without foundation, and has no
reasonable basis in law or fact.
COWARD has not referred to any finding of fact or
onclusion of law in the D
-

Decision that is in error, nor has COWARD asked for any
relief on appeal.
I

1

CONCLUSION
HADLEY seeks relief on appeal to recover attorney fees
and costs against COWARD.
HADLEY also seeks relief on her Cross-Appeal that the
District Court erred in denying recovery of HADLEY'S
attorney fees against COWARD.
The appeal by COWARD should be denied and dismissed
with attorney fees and costs to HADLEY.

On HADLEY'S cross-

appeal the matter should be remanded to the District Court
to award attorney fees to HADLEY for the action, trial, and
matters at the District Court level.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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ajsrAday of March, 2010

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this ZY7kday of March, 2010,
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF, were mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and were
addressed to:
Arthur M. Bistline
Law Office of Arthur M. Bistline
1423 N. Government Way
Coeur d1Alene, Idaho 83814
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